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1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Case for Paid Family Leave 
California made history on September 23, 2002, when Governor Gray 
Davis signed a bill into law creating the nation's first comprehensive paid 
family leave (PFL) program. Although nearly every other country in the 
world guarantees paid leave to employed mothers (and in many cases, 
fathers as well) when they take time off to care for a new child, the United 
States is famously exceptional in its failure to do so.1 Since 1993, the fed-
eral Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) has guaranteed unpaid job-
protected leaves for new parents of up to twelve weeks. However, it makes 
such leaves available to only about half of the U.S. labor force, and even 
those who are covered often cannot afford to take unpaid leaves.2 A hand-
ful of states (including California) have temporary disability programs 
that provide partial wage replacement to mothers during and immediately 
after pregnancy.3 In the rest of the country, however, paid family leave is 
available only to workers whose employers provide it as part of a package 
of fringe benefits. With the exception of union members who often obtain 
such benefits through collective bargaining, non-college-educated workers 
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and others in jobs with low pay and status often lack access even to paid 
sick days and paid vacation, and are even less likely to have employer-
provided disability insurance or paid family leave. The growing numbers 
of freelancers, independent contractors, and other precarious workers who 
have no ongoing ties to a single employer also typically lack these basic 
benefits. As a result, millions of American workers are regularly forced to 
choose between economic security and providing vital care for their fam-
ilies. Against this background, California's 2002 PFL legislation was a 
major breakthrough, along with a similar measure that New Jersey passed 
into law in 2008.4 
The Need for Family Leave 
As family and work patterns have shifted in the United States, demand for 
time off from paid work to attend to family needs has increased dramat-
ically. Several recent social trends have contributed to this growth. The 
most important among them are rising female labor force participation, 
especially among mothers; the aging of the population and the accompa-
nying surge in demand for eldercare; and men's increased involvement 
(although it remains relatively modest) in parenting and other types of un-
paid caregiving. 
In the past, most family care was provided on an unpaid basis by wives 
and mothers, who typically withdrew from the labor force entirely when 
their children were young or when other family members needed assis-
tance. But over the past century, female labor force participation rates, es-
pecially among mothers of young children, have increased dramatically; by 
2010, women were 47 percent of the civilian labor force. Between 1975 and 
2010 alone, the participation rate for mothers with children under age three 
almost doubled, rising from 34 percent to 61 percent. In a sharp historical 
reversal, mothers are now more likely to be in the labor force than women 
generally: the overall female labor force participation rate in 2010 was 
59 percent (U.S. Department of Labor 201 la, 4-5,19). Employment during 
pregnancy has also become the norm: in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, about two-thirds of first-time mothers in the United States were 
employed while pregnant, up from 44 percent in the early 1960s (Laughlin 
2011,4). Although many women still leave the labor force for brief periods 
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when they have children, they are far more likely than in the past to be 
continuously employed over the course of the life cycle. Most mothers in 
the twenty-first century, then, must find ways to balance the needs of their 
children with the demands of their jobs. 
At the same time, many women today—as well as a growing number 
of men—are devoting considerable amounts of time to caring for elderly 
family members. In 2011, the U.S. Department of Labor's American 
Time Use Survey (ATUS) found that 19 percent of employed women 
and 15 percent of employed men were unpaid eldercare providers. Many 
of them were simultaneously engaged in parenting, making up what 
is popularly known as the "sandwich generation." Indeed, the A T U S 
found that 23 percent of adults who were providing eldercare in 2011 
also had children under age eighteen in their households (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 2012a), As the U.S. population has aged, demand for el-
dercare has steadily increased, and reduced family size means that the 
workload involved is distributed across a smaller number of children 
and other kin than in the past. In most families today, all adults are in the 
labor force, so that eldercare demands add to the challenges of balancing 
work and family. 
Men's participation in these activities has increased somewhat in 
recent decades, although women continue to shoulder the bulk of 
unpaid childcare and eldercare alongside their paid work, a pattern 
Gornick and Meyers (2003) call "partial gender specialization." His-
torical data are fragmentary, but the A T U S found that in the 2007-11 
period mothers spent 2.5 times as much time as fathers did providing 
physical childcare (such as feeding or bathing children) in households 
where the youngest child was under age six; for all childcare activities 
combined, the gender gap was nearly as stark: mothers spent 1.9 times 
as much time on childcare as fathers did (in all households with chil-
dren under eighteen). Gender inequality in eldercare is less extreme 
but still substantial: women spent 1.5 times as much time as men did 
providing eldercare in 2011, according to the A T U S (U.S. Department 
of Labor 2012a).5 
In regard to childcare, however, there is evidence of a generational 
shift: not only are younger men engaged in parenting to a greater ex-
tent than their fathers and grandfathers were, but many of them express 
a preference to become even more involved. Young men in long-term 
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heterosexual relationships also face growing demands from their wives 
or partners to participate more fully in family life (Gerson 2010). Yet even 
when they do contribute substantially in terms of time, fathers remain 
far less likely than mothers to leave the labor force or change their hours 
of employment to accommodate childcare demands (Raley, Bianchi, and 
Wang 2012). In part, this reflects the constraints imposed by employers' 
inflexible scheduling demands and traditional gender norms, as well as 
the continuing resilience of those norms in the wider society. Neverthe-
less, the stresses of balancing work and family have increased substan-
tially for men. A 2008 national survey found that 60 percent of employed 
fathers in dual-earner families reported experiencing "some" or "a lot" of 
"work-life conflict," almost double the 1977 level of 35 percent (Galinsky, 
Aumann, and Bond 2011, 18). 
Taken together, these trends—increased maternal labor force par-
ticipation, the aging of the population and the accompanying expan-
sion in the need for eldercare, and increasing male involvement in 
caregiving—have led to rapid growth in demand for family leave in 
the United States in recent decades. Time off from their jobs can allevi-
ate the pressures on workers during periods of peak family caregiving 
demand, like the arrival of a new child, or when serious illness strikes a 
family member. In addition, as a large body of research shows, the recip-
ients of care benefit significantly when their family members have access 
to time off from work. One recent study found a negative effect on the 
frequency of well-baby visits, breastfeeding, and child immunizations 
among children whose mothers returned to work less than twelve weeks 
after childbirth, when compared to those whose mothers took longer 
leaves (Berger, Hill, and Waldfogel 2005; see also Human Rights Watch 
2011, 45-50; Gornick and Meyers 2003, 242-45). Similarly, elderly pa-
tients who are cared for by family members have significantly shorter 
hospital stays and recover faster from illnesses than those who are not 
(Van Houtven and Norton 2004). 
Access to paid time off is critically important in this context, espe-
cially for low-income workers who often cannot afford to take time off 
without some kind of wage replacement. One recent study found that 
parents who have access to paid sick leave or paid vacation time are five 
times more likely to stay home with a sick child than are those who lack 
such benefits. The consequences of this differential are far-reaching, 
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since ill children recover more quickly when their parents are present 
(Heymann 2000,59; see also American Academy of Pediatrics, Commit-
tee on Hospital Care 2003; Ruhm 2000; Schuster 2009). Yet paid time 
off is not available to many workers who need it. As Jody Heymann 
(2000) showed over a decade ago, it has typically been less available to 
women than men, despite the fact that women are still responsible for 
the bulk of family caregiving.6 And it is far less available to the growing 
numbers of low-wage and precarious workers than to their counterparts 
in well-paid, stable jobs—even though the latter can more easily afford 
to take time off even without wage replacement. In short, gender and 
class inequalities are inextricably intertwined with the problem of access 
to family leave. 
Family Leave and Social Inequality 
A major source of gender inequality in the twenty-first century is the 
earnings penalty that women typically experience when they become 
mothers. Although outright gender discrimination in the labor mar-
ket and job segregation by gender has by no means disappeared, it has 
been significantly reduced since the 1970s. Women's educational attain-
ment and career aspirations have risen substantially, and gender-based 
wage disparities have narrowed, especially in entry-level jobs. Declin-
ing real wages for men—especially non-college-educated men—over 
this period also have helped to reduce the gender gap in pay. Yet that 
gap has by no means disappeared; indeed, it widens steadily over the 
typical female career, in a pattern of accumulating disadvantage (Val-
ian 1998; Glass 2004). That motherhood is central to this process is sug-
gested by evidence that even when they do not significantly reduce 
their hours of paid work, mothers' average earnings are significantly 
less than those of childless women (Waldfogel 1997; Budig and England 
2001). The "motherhood penalty" partly reflects the persistently asym-
metric gender division of housework and family care, but there is also 
evidence of direct employer discrimination against mothers, especially 
those in the managerial and professional ranks. By contrast, fathers in 
these occupational categories instead enjoy a wage premium (Correll, 
Benard, and Paik 2007). 
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However, even as gender inequality has lessened, class inequality has 
grown dramatically. The earnings gap between managers and profession-
als and other highly educated workers, on the one hand, and the growing 
ranks of low-wage workers, on the other, has widened steadily since the 
mid-1970s. Pay inequality has increased sharply not only among male 
workers but also among women (Bianchi 1995; McCall 2001). Endoga-
mous marriage and mating patterns—the tendency for people to choose 
spouses and partners from backgrounds similar to their own—multiply 
these inequalities further (McCall 2010). Families are also more stable 
among the affluent, who typically marry at later ages and have lower di-
vorce rates; at the other end of the economic spectrum a disproportionate 
number of families are headed by single mothers employed at low-wage 
jobs (DeParle 2012). And in dual-earner families, what were often in an 
earlier era "second incomes" earned by wives and mothers have become 
increasingly essential to meeting basic living costs (Warren and Tyagi 
2003). 
Inequality among women has also soared in regard to access to paid 
leave, as the U.S. Census Bureau (Laughlin 2011) has recendy documented. 
As figure 1.1 shows, in the 1960s women's access to paid maternity leave 
HLess than high school a High school graduate ESome college •Bachelor's degree or higher 
Figure 1.1. Percentage of women who received paid leave before or after their first birth, by 
educational attainment, selected years, 1961-65 to 2006—08. Paid leave includes all paid maternity, 
sick, and vacation leave, and other paid leave used before the birth and up to twelve weeks after 
the birth. Data from Laughlin 2011, 12. 
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for a first birth varied little by educational level—a reasonable proxy for 
social class. But that began to change in the 1970s, and the shift became 
increasingly apparent in the decades that followed. By the 2006-08 period, 
the most recent for which data are available, 66 percent of employed moth-
ers with a bachelor's degree or more received some form of paid maternity 
leave before or after their first birth, whereas only 19 percent of employed 
women with less than a high school degree did so. 
Table 1.1 exposes the main source of these disparities, namely that ac-
cess to employer-provided paid time off and other fringe benefits is con-
centrated in the upper levels of the labor force. The data in the table are 
drawn from the March 2011 National Compensation Survey (NCS), a 
survey of employers conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor. It high-
lights the pattern of access to selected paid leave benefits by wage level 
(note that unlike figure 1,1 it includes both male and female workers). 
These data show that very few U.S. workers have access to paid family 
leave per se, although many do have access to other forms of paid time off, 
like paid sick leave, paid vacation, and short-term disability—which in 
practice are often used for wage replacement during family leaves. 
TABLE 1.1 Access to selected paid leave benefits for workers in private industry and state and 
local government, by average wage level, March 2011 (%) 
Private industry State and local government 
Paid Paid Paid 
Paid sick Paid Short-term family sick Paid Short-term family 
leave vacation disability leave leave vacation disability leave 
All 
workers 
Average ill 
Second 
25% 
Third 
25% 
Highest 
25% 
63 
32 
66 
74 
85 
77 
51 
84 
90 
89 
38 
17 
36 
47 
58 
11 
5 
10 
12 
19 
89 
75 
93 
94 
96 
60 
56 
84 
70 
36 
23 
19 
26 
26 
23 
17 
14 
17 
18 
18 
Source: National Compensation Survey (U.S. Department of Labor 2011b). 
" The percentile groupings are based on the average wage for each occupation surveyed in the NCS, 
which may include workers above and below the threshold. 
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The key point is that access to such benefits rises sharply with aver-
age wage levels, especially in the private sector.7 For low-wage workers, 
employer-provided paid time off is extremely limited. Among those in oc-
cupations whose average wage was in the lowest 25 percent, two-thirds of 
private-sector workers lacked paid sick leave and nearly half had no access 
to paid vacation, while even greater majorities lacked access to short-term 
disability (83%) and paid family leave (95%). By contrast, those in occu-
pations whose average wage was in the highest 25 percent had extensive 
access to various forms of paid time off. 
The 2011 ATUS confirms this pattern of inequality. Based on work-
ers' self-reports, it found that 50 percent of full-time workers whose usual 
weekly earnings were $540 or less (roughly the bottom 25%) had access to 
some form of paid leave, compared to over 80 percent of full-time workers 
with usual weekly earnings of $831 or more. And only 22 percent of part-
time workers had access to paid leave, the ATUS found (U.S. Department 
of Labor 2012b).8 
The need for financial support during leaves from work is increasingly 
acute for those in the bottom and middle layers of the income distribu-
tion, especially in light of the fact that real incomes for these workers have 
declined sharply in recent decades. Yet, as both figure 1.1 and table 1.1 
show, these workers are far less likely to receive such support than are their 
better-paid counterparts. Many other data sources verify this pattern of class 
disparity. One recent survey, for example, found that two-thirds of low-
income mothers, compared to slightly over a third of middle- and upper-
income mothers, lose pay when they miss work because a child is sick 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2003). Apart from lost income, missing work 
under such conditions often has other negative employment consequences— 
up to and including the risk of being fired, as Joan Williams (2010, chap. 2) 
has documented in detail (see also Williams and Boushey 2010). 
Professional and managerial workers tend to have more flexible sched-
ules (although they also work longer hours, on average) than low-wage 
workers, many of whom are not permitted to leave work to take a fam-
ily member to a medical appointment, and indeed often may not even 
make personal telephone calls on "company time." Similarly, pumping 
breast milk at work is an option available mainly to well-paid professional 
women, while for lower-paid mothers it is "close to impossible," as the 
New Yor^ Times reported (Kantor 2006).9 
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The work-family problems of the majority of female workers, who 
labor at low wages in gender-stereotyped clerical, sales, and service "pink 
collar" jobs, remain relatively invisible both in scholarly literature and in 
public discourse, where the work-family pressures facing women in the 
elite professions and in high-level managerial roles receive a dispropor-
tionate share of attention (see, for example, Blair-Loy 2003; Mason and 
Ekman 2007; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Stone 2007).10 The media 
regularly feature stories about high-level female managers and profes-
sionals who have "opted out" of the workforce to devote themselves to 
motherhood, despite the fact that this is a minority phenomenon even 
Within the female elite (see Williams 2010, chap. 1). A recent example 
that attracted extensive public attention is the 2012 article "Why Women 
Still Can't Have It All," by Anne-Marie Slaughter, who left her high-
level post at the U.S. State Department after two years because the gruel-
ing hours it required precluded her from spending enough time with her 
teenage sons (Slaughter 2012). 
Indeed, a well-documented class difference in regard to work-family 
balance involves the distinctive work scheduling patterns of low-wage 
workers and their more highly paid counterparts. As Jerry Jacobs and 
Kathleen Gerson (2004) have shown, managers and professionals (of both 
genders) typically must work far longer hours than they would prefer.11 In 
contrast, many nonsupervisory workers seek more hours of employment 
than they are offered by employers, and in many cases have jobs with un-
predictable, irregular, and inflexible schedules that make combining work 
and family extremely challenging (Lambert 2008). 
Ironically, the escalating time demands on the nation's upper-tier 
workers emerged just when large numbers of highly educated women 
first gained access to elite professional and managerial jobs. Mary Blair-
Loy (2003) has poignantly exposed the hegemony of the "male model" at 
the highest levels of the business world, where family involvement for 
women (as well as men) is effectively precluded by a deeply entrenched 
corporate culture that demands total "24/7" commitment to the firm. 
A less extreme version of this phenomenon pervades the elite professions 
and the middle management ranks. One result is that even in compa-
nies that appear to be "family friendly," available paid-time-off benefits 
often go underutilized (see Hochschild 1997; Glass 2004). As Blair-Loy 
notes, some women managers respond by "opting out," abandoning their 
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fledgling careers (see also Stone 2007); others forgo motherhood entirely, 
and the rest use their abundant financial resources to hire substitute. 
caregivers. 
The expectation of extensive work hours that is so deeply embedded 
in managerial and professional culture conflicts directly with another set 
of class-specific expectations affecting affluent mothers, namely "intensive 
mothering" (Hays 1996). Upper-middle-class families, eager to reproduce 
their class position, seek to provide their children from infancy onward 
with a wide array of highly structured activities designed to maximize 
their social, emotional, and intellectual development—an effort that 
imposes extensive demands on mothers, as well as on the paid caregivers 
they employ. As Annette Lareau (2003) has documented, parenting takes a 
very different form in working-class communities. 
Although long working hours are an especially serious problem among 
elite female professionals and managers, these women typically have far 
more extensive resources at their disposal for "work-family reconcili-
ation" than their counterparts in clerical, service, sales, and other low-
wage jobs. Well-paid professionals and managers are more able to afford 
the array of services—from prepared meals to paid domestic labor and 
childcare—on which families increasingly rely to reconcile work and 
family demands. And as we have already seen (in figure 1.1 and table 1.1) 
highly educated women and those with high earnings are far more likely 
than their less affluent counterparts to have access to some form of income 
support (through employer-provided benefits) during any leaves from 
work that they take to attend to family needs. When California's PFL 
program began operating in 2004, then, those who stood to gain the most 
were workers in the lower echelons of the labor market. Indeed, the new 
program, which was available to nearly all private-sector workers in the 
state, held the promise of helping to level the playing field in regard to 
access to paid leave. 
California's Paid Family Leave Program 
California's PFL program provides up to six weeks of partial wage 
replacement—55 percent of weekly earnings, up to a maximum benefit of 
$1,011 per week in 2012—for eligible workers who take time off to bond 
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with a new child or to care for a seriously ill family member. Financed by 
a payroll tax, the program builds on California's long-standing State Dis-
ability Insurance (SDI) system, created in 1946 to assist workers suffering 
from temporary disabilities that require them to take time off from work. 
In the 1970s, SDI (along with its counterparts in the other U.S. jurisdic-
tions with temporary disability insurance programs) was extended to cover 
pregnancy-related disability, in keeping with the policy linkage between 
disability and pregnancy established in that period (Vogel 1993). The PFL 
program extended SDI still further to cover "bonding" and "care" leaves, 
with benefits becoming available starting on July 1, 2004. New Jersey fol-
lowed suit, implementing its Family Leave Insurance (FLI) program, 
generally similar to PFL in California, in mid-2009. 
Like SDI, PFL is structured as an insurance program. There are 
no direct costs to employers: the wage replacement benefits are funded 
entirely by an employee-paid payroll tax that finances both SDI and 
PFL. (The combined tax in 2012 was 1,0% on the first $95,585 in 
wages.) Unlike FMLA, California's PFL program does not provide job 
protection, nor does it guarantee the continuation of employer-provided 
health insurance and other fringe benefits, although many leave-takers 
have these protections under FMLA or the California Family Rights 
Act (CFRA). 
Since PFL benefits became available in mid-2004, most women em-
ployed in California's private sector who give birth to a child have been able 
to draw on both SDI and PFL to obtain wage replacement at 55 percent 
of their usual earnings for a total of sixteen to eighteen weeks. Those who 
take advantage of both programs typically receive SDI disability benefits 
for four weeks before delivery, as well as for six to eight weeks after the 
birth (six weeks for normal births, eight for those involving a C-section); 
immediately following that period they receive an additional six weeks of 
PFL benefits for baby bonding. 
Although modest by international standards^ this combined benefit is 
by far the most extensive publicly sponsored paid leave program for new 
mothers in the United States. (New Jersey's FLI program is a close second, 
although its maximum benefit is substantially lower—$572 per week in 
2012.) California's PFL program offers wage replacement for bonding 
leaves not only to biological mothers but also to new fathers, domestic 
partners, and adoptive or foster parents, all of whom are also eligible for 
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up to six weeks of benefits for bonding with a new child. PFL benefits are 
also available to workers who take time off to care for a seriously ill spouse, 
parent, child, or domestic partner. 
The single most important characteristic of the PFL program is that, 
like SDI—but in sharp contrast to FMLA—its coverage is nearly uni-
versal within the private sector. FMLA covers all public-sector workers, 
but in the private sector it is limited to workers employed by organiza-
tions with fifty or more employees on the payroll at or within seventy-
five miles of the worksite. To be eligible for FMLA, workers must also 
have logged 1,250 or more hours for their current employer in the year 
preceding the leave, and they must have worked for that employer for at 
least twelve months. In practice only about half the U.S. workforce, and 
less than one-fifth of new mothers, meet the eligibility requirements for 
FMLA (Ruhm 1997,177). Moreover, many of those who are eligible sim-
ply cannot afford to take advantage of the unpaid leaves FMLA makes 
available. 
By contrast, apart from some self-employed persons, virtually all 
workers in California's private sector are eligible for SDI and PFL 
benefits.12 The only requirement is that claimants must have earned 
$300 or more in wages at a private-sector employer in the state dur-
ing any quarter in the "base period" (typically five to seventeen months 
before filing a claim); there is no threshold for the size of the organiza-
tion they work for, and they need not have worked for their current 
employer for any minimum period of time. Thus, under PFL and SDI 
paid leave is available to the growing numbers of low-wage workers, 
the majority of whom are female, and many of whom are precariously 
employed, with limited or no access to employer-sponsored benefits 
providing paid time off. 
We have been studying the impact of PFL on California employers 
and workers since the bill creating the new program was signed into 
law in late 2002. In this book we report on the results of extensive sur-
vey research and fieldwork that we have conducted over the past decade, 
analyzing the ways in which the state's PFL program has benefited both 
workers and employers in the nation's most populous state, as well as 
the limitations of the program. We also explore some of the lessons that 
can be learned from California's pioneering PFL program—lessons that 
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should be helpful not only to the many other states currently considering 
similar programs but also to the future development of family leave poli-
cies for the nation as a whole. 
One key lesson involves the policy-making process itself. Historically, 
and especially in recent decades, legislative proposals to create new social 
programs have confronted formidable political challenges. For starters, 
U.S. employers can be relied on to vigorously oppose any efforts to intro-
duce new forms of labor market regulation, as they have done consistently 
for more than a century. In recent years, concern about budget deficits and 
growing mistrust of government among the wider population has com-
pounded the challenge facing public policy advocates. Many existing social 
programs are under political attack and others have endured severe budget 
cutbacks. 
Yet paid family leave laws—along with related initiatives such as those 
mandating paid sick days for all workers—continue to enjoy widespread 
popular support, rooted in the steadily increasing pressures on families that 
struggle to balance work outside the home with caring for young children 
or seriously ill family members. As we document in detail in chapter 2, the 
deep reservoir of popular support for paid family leave made it possible 
to build a broad political coalition composed of women's groups, senior 
citizens' organizations, children's advocates, and labor unions to win pas-
sage of California's PFL bill in 2002. 
In chapter 3 we provide an overview of the way the program has func-
tioned over the past decade, reviewing the details of the program's opera-
tion and presenting data on the ways in which California workers have 
utilized PFL. One highlight of this chapter is the fact that male PFL claims 
for bonding with a new child have increased substantially and steadily over 
the years since the program began operating. This suggests that PFL may 
be helping to reduce gender inequality in the division of household and 
family responsibilities (see Lester 2005). 
We then turn to the impact of the program on employers. Although 
California business groups did oppose and actively campaign against the 
PFL legislation, our research shows that their fears about the program 
turned out to have little basis in reality. As we show in chapter 4, compa-
nies have easily adapted to the implementation of PFL over the past de-
cade, and their widely voiced concerns about abuse and of negative effects 
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on productivity and profitability have proven to be almost entirely unwar-
ranted. Instead, our data reveal that many employers have experienced 
cost savings as a result of PFL. The new program indirectly subsidizes em-
ployers who previously provided other forms of wage replacement during 
family leaves, insofar as their employees draw on the state's PFL benefits 
instead. Only a few employers have incurred additional costs as a.result 
of the introduction of PFL, and even they have benefited from improved 
worker morale and reduced turnover. 
California's PFL program also benefits workers and their families 
in a variety of ways, as we show in chapter 5. Not only do those who 
draw on PFL receive much-needed income support when they take 
time off to attend to family needs but recipients of care—new babies 
and seriously ill individuals—experience substantial health-related 
benefits, such as greater duration of breastfeeding and faster recovery 
from illness, when their family members use the program. Both men 
and women take longer leaves than before PFL was established (Rossin-
Slater, Ruhm, and Waldfogel 2013), and they are more satisfied with the 
length of their leaves. 
However, our research also uncovered some serious limitations of the 
program's effectiveness. First and most important, we found that aware-
ness of PFL remains extremely limited among Californians. Although 
support for the idea of paid family leave is extensive across the state's 
diverse population groups, most eligible residents are not even aware that 
the new state program exists. Moreover, awareness is lowest among those 
who would benefit most from the program: Latinos, low-wage workers, 
younger employees, and immigrants. This has substantially limited the 
potential of PFL to act as a social leveler by making wage replacement for 
family leaves universally available, rather than being largely confined to 
the best-paid segments of the workforce. 
Those workers who are aware of PFL, our data show, most often learn 
about it from their employers. And the employers who provide paid leave 
benefits of their own are the ones with the greatest incentive to disseminate 
information about the program, since, as we noted above, their expenses 
are reduced insofar as their employees draw on PFL instead. This dy-
namic tends to reproduce the longstanding inequality in access to paid 
leave between workers—mostly professionals and managers and other 
well-paid employees—who have access to employer-provided benefits and 
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those who lack such access. Unless awareness of PFL grows among the 
rest of the workforce, the stark economic inequalities that characterize 
twenty-first century California will be reinforced more than ameliorated 
by the program. 
We also found that some workers who are aware of PFL have declined 
to claim the benefit, even when they were eligible to use it to take time 
off to bond with a new child or to care for a seriously ill family member. 
Many of these workers reported that they feared that using PFL might 
have negative repercussions for them on the job, potentially reducing their 
chances for career advancement or even leading them to be fired. As noted 
earlier, PFL is structured as an insurance program, and does not include 
any job protection. Some workers have such protection under FMLA or 
CFRA, but for those who lack it and whose employers are unsympathetic 
to their family situations, taking advantage of PFL may indeed be risky 
in terms of job security. Workers' anxieties on this score have only been 
heightened by the high unemployment rates that California has suffered 
since the start of the Great Recession in 2007. 
Another concern that PFL-aware workers expressed about the program, 
one that led some of them not to take advantage of it, is the 55 percent 
wage replacement level. For many workers the benefit is inadequate to 
meet their economic needs. For a variety of reasons, then, PFL take-up 
rates have been lower than expected since the program began operating 
in mid-2004. 
At the end of this book we discuss the implications of our findings 
for future public policy making in the area of work-family balance, 
suggesting ways m which the California PFL program can be improved 
in the years to come. The United States has a long tradition of using states 
as laboratories for public policy making, in that state-level experiments 
often come to inform the crafting of federal legislation. With that in 
mind, we conclude this book with some lessons of California's experience 
with PFL for the rest of the country. 
2 
T H E POLITICS OF FAMILY LEAVE, 
PAST AND PRESENT 
In November 2011, Fox News anchor Megyn Kelly publicly chastised 
conservative talk-show host Mike Gallagher after he lambasted her three-
month maternity leave as "a racket" on the air. Although Kelly shares Gal-
lagher's conservative worldview and has criticized the U.S. government's 
"massive entidement programs" herself on other occasions, she was out-
raged by his comments regarding her use of family leave. "We're pop-
ulating the human race," she exclaimed. "It's not a vacation. It's hard, 
important work." Kelly added that the United States is "the only coun-
try that doesn't require paid maternity leave," pointing out that the FMLA 
provides only for unpaid leaves (Paul 2011). 
As this incident suggests, attitudes about family leave do not always 
conform to broader political patterns. Like the underlying problem of 
work-family balance that it seeks to ameliorate, this is a crossover issue 
that elides the standard conservative denunciation of "big government." 
At the elite level, to be sure, political alignments on such topics are highly 
predictable, with most Republican elected officials and business lobbyists 
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consistently opposing legislative proposals for family leave, while Demo-
crats and organized labor tend to support such initiatives. But among the 
broader population there is a much weaker relationship between political 
identification and attitudes toward family leave. In that regard, Megyn 
Kelly's views are in no way anomalous, as can be seen in figure 2.1, which 
summarizes the results of a representative survey of adult Californians' 
attitudes toward paid leave that we conducted in the fall of 2003—a year 
after the bill creating the nation's first comprehensive PFL program 
became law. 
Although there is some variation in the level of support by political 
orientation—as well as by gender, race and ethnicity, nativity, age, and 
geographical location—what is most striking is the high degree of popu-
lar consensus on this issue. That more than three-fourths of respondents 
who described themselves as "conservative" favored paid leave is partic-
ularly telling. These findings are consistent with those of other surveys 
and polls on the issue. In a 2007 nationwide poll, for example, 76 percent 
Figure 2.1. Support for paid leave among California adults, by selected characteristics, fall 2003. 
N = 1050. The figure shows the proportion of respondents in each subgroup who responded 
"favor" to the question: "Do you favor or oppose the idea of a law that guarantees that eligible 
workers receive a certain portion of their pay when they take family or medical leave?" For more 
details on the survey methodology, see Milkman and Appelbaum 2004. Data from Golden Bear 
Omnibus Survey, University of California Berkeley Survey Research Center. 
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of respondents favored expanding FMLA to guarantee paid leave (Ness 
2008). Similarly, 76 percent of respondents to a 2010 national survey of 
registered voters indicated that they supported paid family leave laws for 
childbirth and family care, and 69 percent of them supported paid sick 
days legislation (Institute for Women's Policy Research 2010). And in a 
November 2012 national election night poll, 86 percent of voters nation-
wide said they thought it was important for Congress and the president to 
consider new laws like paid sick days and paid family and medical leave 
insurance. This poll found strong support across party lines, with 73 per-
cent of Republicans, 87 percent of independents, and 96 percent of Dem-
ocrats saying they thought this was important (National Partnership for 
Women and Families 2012). 
This pattern of broad public support for PFL may appear para-
doxical, given the political ascendancy in the late twentieth century of 
market fundamentalism, or "the idea that society as a whole should 
be subordinated to a system of self-regulated markets" (Somers and 
Block 2005, 261). As many commentators have noted, this perspective is 
especially influential in the United States, which has a long tradition of 
popular mistrust of the state, and indeed market fundamentalist rhet-
oric has contributed to the declining support for many government-
sponsored social programs in recent years. Nevertheless, not only did 
California successfully establish its PFL program in 2002 but sev-
eral other jurisdictions around the country have followed suit in the 
years since. In 2007, Washington State passed a paid family leave law 
(although funding has yet to be provided to begin operating it). The fol-
lowing year, New Jersey passed a law creating a family leave insurance 
program similar to the California PFL program, which began paying 
out benefits in mid-2009. In addition, paid sick days legislation was 
passed in three U.S. cities (Milwaukee, San Francisco, and Washington, 
D.C.) during the first decade of the twenty-first century,, and Connecti-
cut passed the first statewide paid sick days law in 2011. That same year, 
Seattle passed a paid sick days ordinance as well. Building on this mo-
mentum, in 2013 the city councils of Portland, Oregon, and New York 
City both passed paid sick days legislation. At this writing, campaigns 
for paid family leave and paid sick days legislation are under way in 
several other states and cities as well.1 Could work-family legislation 
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be an exception to the general rule that government-sponsored social 
programs are anathema to the majority of Americans in the twenty-first 
century? 
The record of successful advocacy on this issue cannot be explained sim-
ply by reference to the strong public support for paid leave evident in polls 
and surveys like the one depicted in figure 2.1. Indeed, even a broad con-
sensus in favor of an idea is no guarantee of its political success, especially if 
powerful interest groups oppose it. As we document below, the California 
PFL bill faced serious, organized opposition when it was proposed in 2002, 
led by the California Chamber of Commerce and its local affiliates. The 
business lobby strongly denounced the measure, claiming that PFL would 
impose great hardship on employers (especially small businesses), invite 
abuse from workers, and inflict severe economic damage on the state as a 
"job killer." Opponents advanced similar arguments in the other jurisdic-
tions that passed or considered passing paid family leave and paid sick days 
laws in recent years. 
Although the business community's countercampaign failed to prevent 
passage of California's PFL law, it did win some significant modifications 
in the configuration of the program. Whereas the original proposal in-
cluded twelve weeks of paid family leave, with costs evenly split between 
a payroll tax on employers and one on workers, business lobbying led to 
elimination of the employer tax, which in turn reduced the maximum ben-
efit to six weeks. Ultimately workers alone were required to pay the full 
costs of the program.2 Pressure from business groups also resulted in an 
amendment providing that employers could require workers to use up to 
two weeks of paid vacation time before drawing on the PFL benefit (Koss 
2003; Labor Project for Working Families 2003). With these modifica-
tions, the bill was passed by the California state legislature in August 2002, 
and signed into law by the governor a month later. 
A political context where Democrats hold power may be a neces-
sary condition of success for these types of campaigns. In California in 
2002 Democrats had majorities in both houses of the legislature as well 
as the governorship. But this is not a sufficient condition for winning 
passage of laws like the one that created PFL. Two additional key ele-
ments contributed to paid leave advocates' legislative success in California 
and elsewhere: (a) outflanking the business lobby by organizing a wide 
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variety of interest groups into a broad coalition in support of PFL, and 
(b) framing the issue with a narrative highlighting the compelling human 
needs addressed by paid leave, especially its positive effects on children 
and families. To pass California's landmark law, the advocates built a 
broad coalition that included women's organizations, advocates for chil-
dren, senior citizens' groups, medical practitioners, organized labor, and 
others, capitalizing on the popular support for paid leave. The campaign 
leaders were also skilled at framing the issue, focusing public and media 
attention on the ways in which PFL would help families provide care for 
seriously ill loved ones and allow parents to bond with newborn babies. 
They also hammered home the compelling point that workers should not 
be forced to choose between their families and their jobs (Dorfman and 
Lingas 2003). 
Although each of the partners in the coalition backing PFL contrib-
uted to the campaign's success, by all accounts the strong support provided 
by organized labor was especially critical. Labor's political influence in 
California was at a high point in 2002, and the California Labor Federa-
tion (the statewide AFL-CIO body) in particular had extensive lobbying 
experience and detailed knowledge of the legislative process. Unions not 
only had a long track record of winning paid leave benefits for their mem-
bers through the collective bargaining process (see Gerstel and Clawson 
2001) but they also had consistently supported legislation to expand such 
benefits for workers generally. And, crucially, the leadership of the state 
Federation was strongly committed to the PFL bill. 
Another factor that worked in favor of PFL advocates was the fact that 
the proposed program was relatively simple and inexpensive to adminis-
ter. The fact that it could be funded by a modest payroll tax with little or 
no fiscal impact immediately removed one of the standard conservative 
arguments from debate. In this regard it was also helpful that in Cali-
fornia (and later in New Jersey), the bureaucratic machinery to provide 
temporary disability benefits was already in place, and the administration 
of PFL benefits could be incorporated into the existing agency's responsi-
bilities at minimal expense. Although that particular approach is feasible 
only in the handful of states that already have temporary disability insur-
ance programs, paid leave advocates have developed alternative mecha-
nisms to administer paid leave programs in other states and nationally 
that similarly build on existing bureaucratic capacity—for example, by 
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linking paid leave benefits to existing state unemployment insurance pro-
grams or to the federal Social Security system (see Workplace Flexibility 
2010 and CHEFS 2010). 
The political dynamics that shaped the successful campaigns for paid 
family leave in the states of Washington and New Jersey, and in the vari-
ous jurisdictions around the country that enacted paid sick days laws in 
the early twenty-first century, were generally similar to those that led 
to PFL's successful passage in California in 2002. In each case business 
and employer organizations vigorously opposed the enabling legisla-
tion, yet ultimately the advocates prevailed. Passing social legislation is 
never easy, especially in the twenty-first century's intensely antigovern-
ment climate. But in the nation's "blue" cities and states it can be done 
with a strong and well-organized coalition, including vital support from 
organized labor—which cannot be taken for granted, since some labor 
leaders, most of whom are still male, may not see this issue as a high 
priority—and a campaign narrative that highlights the growing pres-
sures on workers struggling to reconcile family responsibilities with em-
ployment. Framing the issue in stark human terms, as these campaigns 
have demonstrated, can trump market fundamentalist rhetoric that con-
structs paid leave as a "job killer." 
The Politics of Paid Family Leave in Historical Perspective 
Employer opposition to social insurance proposals has a long history, 
stretching back long before the recent ascendancy of market fundamental-
ism. Nor is such opposition limited to the United States. As Gosta Esping-
Andersen (1990,22) pointed out in his classic comparative study of welfare 
capitalism, throughout the capitalist world "employers have always op-
posed de-commodification," defined as any service "rendered as a matter 
of right. . . [that allows individuals] to maintain a livelihood without re-
liance on the market," He classifies the United States among the "liberal" 
(that is, market-oriented) countries where such opposition is especially 
strong.3 Indeed, for more than a century, U.S. employers have mobilized 
consistently to oppose not only decommodification proposals but also a va-
riety of other basic labor regulations, ranging from minimum wage and 
maximum hours legislation to occupational health and safety standards. 
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As historians Sanford Jacoby (1997) and Jennifer Klein (2003) have shown, 
the result has been a nation with extremely underdeveloped state social 
provision alongside a "public-private welfare state" (Klein 2003) in which 
employer-provided health insurance and other "fringe benefits" are made 
available to some workers, with far more meager provision for the popu-
lation as a whole. 
Indeed, except in California, New Jersey, and the few other jurisdic-
tions with temporary disability insurance programs, U.S. workers who 
have paid leave benefits receive them direcdy from employers. As a re-
sult, access to paid leave is unequally distributed across the workforce. 
The basic pattern is similar to that of health insurance coverage: well-paid 
managers and professionals are more likely than low-wage workers to 
have access to paid-time-off benefits; those who work for large companies 
are more likely to have access than those employed by small businesses or 
the self-employed; unionized workers are more likely to have access than 
their nonunion counterparts; and public-sector workers are more likely to 
have access than those in the private sector. 
This reflects both employers' greater interest in retaining highly trained 
employees with firm-specific skills and the variation in bargaining lever-
age between union and nonunion workers, on the one hand, and between 
private- and public-sector workers, on the other (the latter are not only 
far more likely to be unionized but their employers are not seeking profit-
maximization). Moreover, the costs associated with employer-provided 
paid family leave—unlike those for many basic labor standards such as 
maximum hours or paid vacation'—vary enormously depending on the 
size of the business as well as the demographic composition of the work-
force. A company whose workforce is made up primarily of women of 
childbearing age would have much higher costs than one with a largely 
male workforce, for example. The same general point applies to employer-
provided health insurance, although in that case an older workforce tends 
to increase costs. 
In contrast to health insurance coverage, however, employer-provided 
paid leave benefits (typically cobbled together from some combination of 
paid vacation, sick leave, disability insurance, and parental leave) are vir-
tually never extended to workers' spouses or domestic partners—a serious 
limitation given the fact that men are more likely than women to have 
access to all types of paid-time-off benefits, even as women continue to 
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provide the bulk of child and family caregiving. Yet, whereas a growing 
number of employers—faced with the huge and rapidly rising costs of pro-
viding health coverage—have lent their political support to national health 
insurance legislation, almost none openly support publicly sponsored paid 
leave programs like California's PFL—despite the fact that such programs 
would provide many of them with significant cost savings, as we show 
in chapter 4. The widely varying costs of paid family leave for different 
types of employers make government-sponsored social insurance, such as 
the California PFL program, a particularly viable approach to meeting the 
work-family reconciliation needs of workers, a point we discuss further in 
chapter 6. Nevertheless, the political reality on the ground is that the busi-
ness lobby consistently opposes all decommodification legislation, whether 
it takes the form of social insurance or not. 
The history of previous U.S. work-family legislation is instructive in 
this regard. Popular support for national family leave legislation gained 
increasing traction in the late 1970s, as more and more mothers entered 
the labor force. Yet even the minimalist (by international standards) 
FMLA became law in the face of unrelenting opposition from business 
interests. Fifteen years earlier, business had also opposed the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA), which outlawed employment discrimination 
on the basis of pregnancy; with support from a coalition led by orga-
nized labor and feminist organizations it nevertheless became law in 1978 
(Vogel 1993, 71). Passing national legislation on such issues became more 
difficult in the period of conservative ascendancy that followed the 1980 
election, but advocates nevertheless began campaigning for a family and 
medical leave law in 1985. During the presidency of George H. W. Bush, 
Congress voted to approve bills similar to the 1993 FMLA twice, with 
significant bipartisan support, but Bush vetoed both bills. The issue was 
then debated in the 1992 presidential election campaign, and immedi-
ately afterward, in January 1993, Congress passed a modified version of 
the legislation. A month later, FMLA was signed into law by President 
Clinton—the very first bill he signed after taking office (Martin 2000; 
Bernstein 2001). 
The seven-year campaign for FMLA is in many respects the proto-
typical case of political contestation over work-family policy in the United 
States. The national Chamber of Commerce and small-business groups 
vigorously opposed the bill, while organized labor and the women's 
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movement led the coalition lobbying for it. As Taylor Dark (1999, 166) 
has documented, two key unions, the Service Employees International 
Union and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, both of which have large female memberships, were "key 
proponents of the legislation, providing financial resources, interest 
group coordination, and personnel for the lobbying drive." The FMLA 
campaign, however, was a broader coalition effort, with strong backing 
from the National Organization for Women and other feminist organiza-
tions that had previously worked to win passage of the PDA, along with 
children's advocates and others (see Bernstein 2001, chap. 5), who joined 
forces against the business lobby. 
Cathie Jo Martin succinctly summarizes the arguments of FMLA's 
opponents: 
Small business predicted dire economic impacts to companies from the 
high costs of hiring replacement workers... [and] also argued that the new-
benefit would constrict the creation of jobs and hurt female workers by mo-
tivating employers to discriminate against women in hiring... and reduce 
the flexibility with which managers and workers could negotiate compen-
sation packages. (Martin 2000,221-22) 
It was perfectly acceptable for companies to offer such benefits voluntarily 
(as many already did, especially for professional and managerial employees), 
but the business lobby passionately opposed any employer "mandate" in 
this area. As Martin rendered the business view: "Although parental and 
disability leaves are excellent employee benefits, Congress should not dic-
tate benefits. Doing so is contrary to the voluntary, flexible and compre-
hensive benefits system that the private sector has developed." (Martin 
2000,221) 
The claims that leave legislation would have negative effects on com-
panies are largely unsupported (as we show in chapter 4 for the Cal-
ifornia PFL case), but they are an integral component of the market 
fundamentalism that underlies the worldview of the business lobby. 
That ideological orientation has proven impervious thus far to the en-
ergetic efforts of work-family advocates to articulate the "business case" 
for family leave—a case built around evidence that providing workers 
with access to leave reduces turnover, offering substantial cost savings 
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to employers, and that such access also boosts employee morale and re-
duces "presenteeism," or going to work while sick (see Williams 2010, 
65-71). The problem is that business opposition to family leave legis-
lation is not rooted in evidence-based cost-benefit analysis, but rather 
reflects a broader animus against all types of "employer mandates," in-
cluding even minimum- and living-wage laws. In the neoliberal era that 
began in the mid-1970s, all such proposals are routinely denounced as 
"job killers." . 
Among employers, the New Deal system of social provision has lost 
the limited legitimacy it once enjoyed, so that business opposition to 
virtually any proposal for paid leave—which is simultaneously a form 
of decommodifi cation and a type of labor regulation—is a foregone con-
clusion. In our fieldwork we have even encountered corporate manag-
ers who, blissfully ignorant of practices in the rest of the world, go so 
far as to assert that the introduction of paid family leave in the United 
States would endanger the nation's global competitiveness. One high-
level California corporate manager, in expressing her chagrin about the 
state's PFL law shortly after its passage, suggested that it would hurt 
the state economically. "That's why we moved our call center to Ire-
land!" she exclaimed, evidently unaware that paid leave had existed 
in Ireland for half a century. On the other hand, frontline and middle 
managers who regularly witness the challenges of work-family balance 
on the ground tend to be more supportive. Indeed, as Frank Dobbin has 
shown, in many cases human resource managers (a majority of whom 
are female) helped to institutionalize maternity leave in their companies 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Dobbin 2009, 170-75).4 
Their market fundamentalist orientation notwithstanding, employers 
are able to rapidly adjust to political defeat on these issues. Thus, only a 
few years after the business lobby lost the battle to prevent the passage of 
FMLA, most companies had adapted with little difficulty to its require-
ments. Although there has been some concern about the extent to which 
FMLA's requirements are enforced (see Gerstel and Armenia 2009), a U.S. 
Department of Labor survey of employers conducted in 2000 found that 
about two-thirds (64%) of respondents found it "very easy" or "somewhat 
easy" to comply with FMLA rules. Moreover, 84 percent of employer re-
spondents reported that-the new law had "no noticeable effect" or a "positive 
effect" on their companies' productivity, while 90 percent said it had "no 
